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“A HORRIBLE FASCINATION”:
SEGREGATION, OBSCENITY, AND THE CULTURAL CONTINGENCY OF RIGHTS
ANDERS WALKER♦

ABSTRACT
Building on current interest in the regulation of child pornography, this
article goes back to the 1950s, recovering a lost history of how southern
segregationists used the battle against obscenity to counter the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. Itself focused on the
psychological development of children, Brown sparked a discursive
backlash in the South focused on claims that the races possessed different
cultures and that white children would be harmed joined a larger, regional
campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by moderates and
extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment terrain even as
the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to federal might. A
radical re-reading of prevailing understandings of southern resistance to
Brown, this article posits that civil rights proved much more culturally
contingent than scholars have so far recognized, reframing the manner in
which we understand Brown, its progeny, and current constitutional
debates over the relationship between rights and race.
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“A HORRIBLE FASCINATION”:
SEX, SEGREGATION, AND THE LOST POLITICS OF OBSCENITY

ANDERS WALKER♦

INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1959, Virginia newspaper editor James
Jackson Kilpatrick adopted the alias “Billy Williams” and began
purchasing large quantities of pornography through the mail.1 While
Kilpatrick was himself a married father of three with a respectable address
on Hanover Avenue in Richmond, Billy was “a twenty-three-year-old
bakery salesman, a high-school graduate, interested in dirty pictures, dirty
movies, [and] sexy correspondence.”2 Within weeks, Billy’s inquiries led
to a flood of obscene material, including an offer “to buy action films from
Copenhagen.”3 Inspired, Kilpatrick generated a second fictive persona,
“Joseph Rocco,” “an effeminate, fruity sort of character, devoted to
bondage pictures, male nudes, [and] the more delicate and bizarre forms of
erotica.”4
Kilpatrick’s pornographic personae marked a dramatic departure
from the man that most Virginians knew him to be, a loyal supporter of
arch-conservative Senator Harry Flood Byrd, and one of the South’s
foremost advocates of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of
♦
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Education.5 Since 1955 – a year after the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision – Kilpatrick had used his newspaper, the Richmond News-Leader,
platform-fashion to criticize the ruling.6 In editorial after editorial, he
blasted Brown as a violation of states’ rights, celebrated Senator Byrd’s
call for “massive resistance,” and even “revived” an eighteenth century
theory of constitutional defiance known as “interposition.”7 The doctrine
of interposition held that states could reject federal authority whenever
they believed “that authority violated the Constitution,” a notion rooted in
Madisonian opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.8. By 1957,
almost every southern state had adopted interposition as either official or
symbolic policy, making Kilpatrick one of the single-most important
architects of southern opposition to the Supreme Court.9
How, if at all, did Williams and Rocco fit into this picture? Were
there ties between Kilpatrick’s views of Brown and his views of prominent
1950s Supreme Court obscenity cases like Kingsley v. Regents and Roth v.
United States?10 Or, was it mere coincidence that he began to develop
fictive alter-egos interested in pornography at the very same time that he
led the South’s legal charge against civil rights? A letter penned by
Kilpatrick on January 7, 1960 provides a clue. “All this is now futile,” he
began, writing to Virginia state representative Edward Lane.11 Though
“the interposition movement of four years ago had great political value …
[y]ou know what happened since then as well as I … [t]he full power and
weight of the Federal judiciary have been thrown into enforcement of the
doctrines laid down generally in Brown v. Board of Education, and the
impact of that decision no longer can be avoided.”12 Rather than continue
massive resistance, argued Kilpatrick, the South needed to change tactics,
to “do what the repeal forces did in the early 1920’s” to end Prohibition,
5

Garret Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10
CONST. COMMENT. 19 (1993); JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES:
NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA (1957); JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN
CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962).
6
RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, INTERPOSITION: EDITORIALS AND EDITORIAL PAGE
PRESENTATIONS (1956); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129 (1997).
7
DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM
CROW 168 (2004); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129 (1997).
8
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SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 129, 131 (1997). See also, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004).
10
Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
11
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namely “labor unceasingly to create a climate of opinion nationally in
which the decision itself, if not actually reversed, will be effectively
modified or controlled by acts of Congress.”13 This called not for “foolish
and useless laws,” concluded Kilpatrick, but “propaganda, publicity, and
education.”14
It was a new turn, and one that helped explain Kilpatrick’s sudden
interest in obscenity – a topic that he declared held a “horrible fascination”
for him.15 As this article will demonstrate, Kilpatrick wove threads of
interposition into The Smut Peddlers, using the battle against pornography
to build a new coalition, one determined to prevent the Supreme Court
from wresting further power from the states, this time under the rubric of
upholding morality – itself a front for undermining civil rights. Rather
than a quixotic, one-man quest, Kilpatrick’s turn to prudence joined a
larger, regional campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by
moderates and extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment
terrain even as the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to
federal might. Dubious moral regulations emerged across the region,
southern officials declared the need to reinvigorate decency, and land
bridges between the South and the nation began to surface, particularly as
civil rights protest devolved into urban riots in 1965.
Animating this shift was a pervading sense that the civil rights
movement had to be engaged on its own terms, not with violence or vitriol
but moral rhetoric and aspirational politics. Just as movement leaders like
Martin Luther King, Jr. extolled black heroism and disciplined nonviolence, so too did segregationists like Kilpatrick feel compelled to
celebrate the best of the white South; its civility, its manners, and its
paternalist concern for African Americans who, of course, segregationists
then painted as illegitimate, immoral, and inept. If successful, Kilpatrick
hoped to undermine the persuasive power of black leaders like King,
meanwhile winning national support for the struggle against Brown.
However, accomplishing such a task involved a delicate cultural politics.
On the one hand, white officials aimed to delegitimate civil rights by
increasing moral regulations of extra-marital sex, common law marriage,
and illegitimacy – essentially reframing black culture as pathological –
meanwhile recasting white southerners as morally principled arbiters of
decency, a move reinforced by a sudden interest in the seemingly non-race
related subject of pornography.
To illustrate, this article will proceed in five parts. Part I will
recover the first signs of a cultural backlash to Brown in the South,
showing how segregationists feared the ruling’s effect on the
indoctrination of racial prejudice in white youth, even as they seized on
the opinion’s social science evidence to forge a statistically constructed
moralist response. Part II will show how said response bled onto legal
13
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terrain, sparking a web of regulations on marriage, adoption, and
illegitimacy, all aimed at preserving segregation through coded, legislative
means. Part III shows how segregationists applied these means to the
national framework, looking both to bridge southern interests with voters
in the North and West, even positing amendments to the United States
Constitution under the rubric of controlling pornography. Part IV reveals
the manner in which such discursive moves intersected with the direct
action phase of the civil rights movement, prompting a series of exchanges
between black activists and white segregationists on the explicitly cultural
terrains of language, dress, and literature. Finally, Part V recovers the
constitutional implications of these intersections, first through victories
against illegitimacy, and then a surprising right-hand turn on the Supreme
Court.
What lessons do we learn from such an inquiry? First, though
legal historians have tended to portray southern resistance to Brown in
terms of massive resistance, such readings only scratch the surface of
segregationist strategy in the 1950s and 60s.16 Second, while southern
historians like David Chappell argue that the white South failed to develop
a Christian response to the prophetic religion of the Civil Rights
Movement, a close look at segregationist turns to moral regulations
indicates that segregationists did in fact assemble such a response, though
not one articulated in prophetic terms.17 Rather than invoke prophetic
religion, segregationist turned to a discourse of personal morality, one that
proved particularly insidious precisely because it merged Puritanical
notions of sexual sin with longstanding presumptions that the law should
in fact be used to control such sin, even if no harm was involved.18 Even
scholars who take segregationist religion seriously have missed this point,
arguing instead that southern whites became preoccupied with
“proclaiming the end of time and the irrelevance of life in the flesh.”19
Rather than consider life in the flesh irrelevant, segregationists
worked hard to link Evangelical notions of personal purity with
conservative fears of delinquency, pornography, and the corruption of
minors more generally, laying the foundations for a discourse that would
come to win popular support through the end of the Twentieth Century.20
16

See e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 385-442 (2004).
17
DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM
CROW 5 (2004).
18
Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1962).
19
Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, 91 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 119, 121 (2004).
20
Whitney Strub, Perversion for Profit: Citizens for Decent Literature and the Arousal of
the Antiporn Public in the 1960s 15 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 258, 260,
291 (2006) (noting that “[p]ornography remained central to the New Right’s moral
outrage” into the 1980s); Whitney Strub, Black and White and Banned All Over: Race,
Censorship, and Obscenity in Postwar Memphis 40 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 703
(2007) (showing how segregationists in Memphis turned to “moralistic fervor” in the
struggle against civil rights). See also CHRIS HEDGES, AMERICAN FASCISTS: THE
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Indeed, the significance of segregationist turns to personal morality lay
precisely in their ability to appeal across regional lines, transforming the
struggle against Brown into a decidedly cultural crusade for the
preservation of personal, moral values and Christian virtue.21
That obscenity became entangled in this project is worth noting.
Even today, attitudes toward obscenity differ significantly based on
whether the targets are children or adults, a phenomenon exemplified in
the current disconnect between prosecutions of minors for “sexting”;
contrasted with the constitutional protection of adult-makers of “crush”
videos involving the torture of animals.22 Now, as then, prosecutions for
pornography seem to be animated more by an interest in monitoring
children than ending exploitation or cruelty, a concern that assumed a
bizarrely sinister guise during the struggle for civil rights.
Further, documenting segregationist moves to pornography
broadens our understanding not simply of southern resistance to civil
rights, but what scholars Paul Brest, Sanford Levison, Jack Balkin, Akhil
Amar, and Reva Siegel call the “processes of Constitutional decisionmaking.”23 Interested in the role that “other political institutions” besides
the Court play in Constitutional interpretation, Brest and company limit
their discussion of segregationist reactions to Brown to “The Southern
Manifesto,” a document pledging that the South will use “all lawful
means” to combat the ruling.24 Missing, however, is any discussion of
what, precisely, those legal means were, how they aimed to curry popular
opinion against the Court, and how they carried the constitutional struggle
for racial equality onto explicitly cultural terrain – terrain that raises
questions about the cultural contingency of rights generally in the United
States.
Put simply, the terrain of culture became a lost front in the struggle
for racial equality at mid-Century.25 The end of segregation, this article
will demonstrate, created fears across the South not simply of racial
CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE WAR ON AMERICA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006);
JOHN C. GREEN, ET AL., THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: MARCHING TO
THE MILLENIUM (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2003); Marshall
Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (1979, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2006); RONALD J. SIDER & DIANE KNIPPERS, TOWARD AN EVANGELICAL
PUBLIC POLICY: POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE HEALTH OF A NATION (Grand Rapids:
Baker Books, 2005).
21
Id.
22
Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youths Showing Off Online, N.Y. TIMES, March 21,
2010, A1; Justices Overturn Anti-animal Cruelty Law, WASHINGTON POST, April 21,
2010, A3; Crush Animal Cruelty; The Next Step is Up to Congress, WASHINGTON POST,
April 25, 2010, A21.
23
PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (5th ed., 2006).
24
PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 904 (5th ed.,
2006).
25
The idea that the realm of culture can be implicated in political struggle is nothing new.
For an early exposition of the relationship between culture and political conflict, see
ANTONIO GRAMSCI, THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1929).
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integration, but social, moral, and sexual disorder, particularly among
youth. Public officials responded to such fears by pushing for increased
legal regulation of both the public and private spheres, including marriage,
adoption, and illegitimacy. For segregationists like Kilpatrick, such
regulations of culture promised a salve for social insecurities generated by
Brown, even as they posed a potential threat to the cultural claims inherent
in white supremacy. If the region pushed too far in the area of cultural
control, feared Kilpatrick, it would risk appearing backward and philistine,
undermining racist arguments that southern whites were culturally
superior to blacks. Critical to the South’s chances at preserving
segregation, in other words, was carving out a constitutional and cultural
defense of Jim Crow that voters across the country could endorse.
Consequently, Kilpatrick became deeply involved not simply in the legal
struggle over civil rights, but also a larger, literary struggle over the
cultural implications of recognizing those rights.

I. THE ‘UNPREJUDICED’ MIND
Long before James Jackson Kilpatrick shifted his attention from
interposition to pornography, segregationist voices called for a moral
crusade against civil rights. Among the first to do so was Mississippi
Judge Thomas Pickens Brady, a staunch segregationist who traveled from
his home in Brookhaven, Mississippi to nearby Greenwood to deliver a
talk in late May 1954.26 Later distributed by segregationists across the
South, Brady’s talk posited that desegregation would quickly lead to
interracial sex.27 “Constantly,” argued Brady, “the [N]egro will be
endeavoring to usurp every right and privilege which will lead to
intermarriage.”28 Such arguments, as historians have shown, were not only
common in the post-Brown South but coincided with prohibitions against
interracial marriage dating back at least two hundred years.29
26

NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE
SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, 85 (1997).
27
For the influence of Brady’s speech on massive resistance, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY,
THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE
1950S 85 (1999).
28
THOMAS PICKENS BRADY, BLACK MONDAY (Greenwood: Association of Citizens’
Councils (1954).
29
PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING
OF RACE IN AMERICA 19, 225-26 (2009) (discussing the history of miscegenation law
generally, and arguments that integration would lead to miscegenation in Mississippi
specifically). See also, Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of
Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-1934 20 LAW & HISTORY REV. 225 (2002); Martha
Hodes, The Sexualization of American Politics: White Women and Black Men in the
South after the Civil War 3 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 402 (1993;
MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-
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Yet, woven through Brady’s intermarriage claim were strange
threads, hints not simply that integration might encourage illicit sex, a
common fear, but that integration might actually prevent children from
developing race prejudice.30 “[Y]ou cannot place little white and [N]egro
children together in classrooms and not have integration,” asserted Brady,
“[t]hey will grow up together and the sensitivity of the white children will
be dulled.”31 Brady’s mention of sensitivity indicated that racism was
something that had to be inculcated in youth, a refinement of sorts that
children did not naturally possess. Others agreed. Writing for the Atlantic
Monthly in 1956, South Carolina journalist Herbert Ravenal Sass declared
that “the elementary public school” had to remain segregated “at all costs”
because white youth possessed “unprejudiced” minds.32
“[R]ace
preference is not active in the very young,” warned Sass, but was rather
“one of those instincts which develop gradually as the mind develops and
which, if taken in hand early enough, can be prevented from developing at
all.”33
Not all segregationists framed their fear of integration in terms of
eroding prejudice. Some spoke of harm. “I submit that white children
also have rights,” proclaimed Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland only
weeks after Brown was handed down.34 “[T]ensions and frictions
generally found in an interracial school,” continued Eastland, “certainly
will have a bad effect on a white child, and in my judgment will interfere
with the white child’s ability to learn.”35 South Carolina journalist
William D. Workman echoed Eastland’s concerns in a book defending Jim
CENTURY SOUTH (1997); JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEENATION AND
MULATTOES IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); See also KEVIN MUMFORD, INTERZONES:
BLACK/WHITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1997); Phoebe Godfrey, Bayonets, Brainwashing, and Bathrooms: The
Discourse of Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Desegregation of Little Rock’s Central
High, 62 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 42 (2003).
30
Scholars of children in the South have not recognized the extent to which even staunch
segregationists like Brady realized race prejudice was artificially inculcated in youth.
See, e.g. REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE
AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2009); Notions that white
children had to be educated on the ideology of race were nothing new. Colonial elites in
places as distant as British South Africa and the Dutch East Indies struggled incessantly
with the challenge of European children abandoning European ways, leading to an entire
discourse on the proper training, or education, of white youth, discourses that prefigured
white concerns in the American South during the 1950s. Ann Laura Stoler, Sexual
Affronts and Racial Frontiers, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A
BOURGEOIS WORLD 215 (Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds, 1997); ANN
LAURA STOLER, THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND
THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 105 (1995).
31
Id. at 65.
32
Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
1956, 18, 19.
33
Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
1956, 18.
34
James O. Eastland, Congressional Record – Senate, July 23, 1954, 11523.
35
Id.
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Crow. “[T]he integrationists, who cry for racial admixture in the cause of
bolstering the personality development of a Negro minority,” complained
Workman, “do not hesitate to compel the mingling of a white minority
with a black majority without any consideration of the inevitable
psychological impact upon the personalities of the white children. Indeed,
there has been monumental indifference on the part of the race-mixers
concerning the likelihood of adverse psychological effects upon white
children.”36
Exacerbating southern interest in “psychological effects” was
Brown’s own reasoning which cited social science data to establish that
segregated schools violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not simply because schools were unequal, but because racial
separation per se inflicted psychological harm on black youth.37 Georgia
Attorney General Eugene Cook lamented the fact that, in his view, “the
justices based their decision not upon any premise or tenet of law, but
solely upon sociological and psychological theories.”38 South Carolina
Senator Olin D. Johnston agreed, noting that when he “became a United
States Senator … [he] took an oath to support and defend the Constitution
of the United States” but this did not include supporting “sociological
pronouncements of a Supreme Court” that replaced law with arbitrary
“judicial dictatorship.”39
Outrage at the Court’s reliance on social science data convinced
some segregationists, including James Jackson Kilpatrick, that outright
defiance or “massive resistance” to the Court was the South’s best hope,
prompting him to launch a legal campaign of “interposition” from his desk

36

WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH (1960), 241.
Even northern sources commented on the Court’s reliance on social psychology.
“Relying more on the social scientists than on legal precedents – a procedure often in
controversy in the past,” noted The New York Times, “the court insisted on equality of the
mind and heart rather than on equal school facilities.” “The court’s opinion read more
like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court opinion,” continued the Times,
“it sustained the argument of experts in education, sociology, psychology, psychiatry and
anthropology.” James Reston, A Sociological Decision: Court Founded Its Segregation
Ruling on Hearts and Minds Rather Than Laws, N. Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, p. 14-L.
See generally, DARRYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT & PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE
IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997).
38
53 NAACP Heads Reds, Says Cook: Georgia Attorney General Talks at N.O. Rally,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), March 21, 1956, p. 3.
39
Centralization Hit by SC Solons: Lawmakers Issue Warnings In Both Senate, House,
THE STATE (Columbia, SC), March 2, 1956, p. 1. Even moderate Florida protested.
According to the Florida legislature, the Supreme Court had “cited as authority for the
assumed and asserted facts the unsworn writings of men, one of whom was the hireling of
an active participant in the litigation. Others were affiliated with organizations declared
by the attorney general of the United States to be subversive, and one of whom, in the
same writing which the court cited as authority for its decision stated that the Constitution
of the United States is ‘impractical and unsuited to modern conditions.’” THE LAWS OF
FLORIDA, 1956.
37
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in Richmond.40 First devised by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in
response to the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the doctrine
of interposition held that it was “the unquestionable right” of individual
states to resist unconstitutional federal action. Though not quite as
dramatic as armed revolt, the theory nevertheless held that states could
interpose their will against the Supreme Court, a proposition that flirted
with outright rejection of the federal government. Yet, Kilpatrick viewed
it – at the time – to be a genteel means of refuting Brown.41 Indeed, to his
mind, interposition represented a bridge issue, a non-objectionable concept
that the South might use to relate to the rest of the country, perhaps even
currying national favor. “[T]he fate of the schools,” argued Kilpatrick in
1957, for example, “is not the most vital issue here at bar. Far
transcending any question of race or instruction, is the greater conflict
over the stability of the Constitution . . . If States outside the South are to
comprehend the peril before them,” he continued, “they would do well to
look beyond the frontal fight of Brown v. Board of Education to the
flanking decisions in which State powers also are being steadily
destroyed.”42 Kilpatrick went on to discuss a series of “flanking” cases,
all decided by the Supreme Court that increased the power of the federal
government over the states. Among them were United States v. California
and United States v. Louisiana, both declaring the federal government sole
owner of “the land, minerals and other things of value” off the coasts of
California and Louisana.43 Also indicative of federal creep were Garner
v. Teamsters Union, dismissing state remedies for labor disputes, and
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, overturning state convictions of suspected
communists.44 Such rulings, argued Kilpatrick represented a frightening

40

NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE
SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 126-149 (1999).
41
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF
VIRGINIA 77, 86-98, 178-79, 186-99 (1957). “The Supreme Court can be resisted in a
dozen lawful ways,” wrote Kilpatrick in 1956, “[i]ts despotic usurpation of power can be
fought judicially, politically, legislatively. Without compromising principle, without
bowing to the Court’s unwarranted mandates, the South can yet win.” James Jackson
Kilpatrick, Fringes of the Storm, RICHMOND NEWS-LEADER, Sept. 5, 1956, 10.
42
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF
VIRGINIA 286-87 (1957).
43
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF
VIRGINIA 287 (1957), citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
44
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF
VIRGINIA 2 (1957); citing Garner, et al, trading as Central Transfer Co. vs. the
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 24 L.W. 4178 (1956). That
Brown might be successfully opposed was perhaps not as farfetched as it seemed. After
all, Robert Dahl’s seminal article, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
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campaign by the federal government to rob the states of their sovereignty.
Protecting that sovereignty, not preserving white supremacy, constituted
the South’s ultimate reason for rejecting the Supreme Court.
Impressed, segregationists across the South adopted interposition
as either official or symbolic policy, making it a pronounced component of
the larger campaign of massive resistance to Brown.45 Yet, interposition
was not the only strategy pursued by southern states.46 Across the South,
moderates proclaimed that Brown could be circumvented through other,
more subtle means.47 In Florida, Governor LeRoy Collins warned that
pursuing a course of “hot words” would only jeopardize the South’s
position, and that “smart lawyers” could find “lawful and peaceful means”
to circumvent the ruling.48 Mississippi Governor J.P. Coleman agreed,
warning that “[w]e can’t preserve segregation by defying the federal
government,” but rather, the South needed to employ “legal means” to
subvert the decision.49
What kind of means?
Coleman developed a model for
circumventing Brown that states across the South emulated, one that
focused on removing all mention of race from southern state law,
meanwhile using coded signifiers to assign students to schools.50 Called
“pupil placement,” Coleman developed this plan while listening to oral
arguments in Brown, months before the case was decided.51 The strategy
hinged on using social science evidence, particularly illegitimacy rates, to
assign students to schools based on “public health,” and “morals.”52 As
the next section will show, such “pupil placement plans” spread across the
South, sparking a wave of related, moral regulations aimed at preserving
Jim Crow.53
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II. MORAL REGULATIONS
Coleman’s endorsement of pupil placement as a “legal means” of
circumventing Brown marked a distinctly different form of resistance than
constitutional defiance, or interposition, a strategy that quickly implicated
other laws. For example, in 1956 Coleman signed a bill into law that
abolished common law marriage, hoping to boost black illegitimacy rates
and “aid segregation by permitting the state to segregate on a basis of
‘unfavorable moral background’ instead of race.”54 The “theory of the
bill,” reported the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate “was to set up
unfavorable moral background as a basis for segregation,” a background
measured entirely by focusing on illegitimacy rates.55 Of course, in citing
such rates segregationists did not bother to mention whether they may
have been artificially suppressed in white communities through either
abortions or adoptions, a recurring practice according to the Virginia
League of Local Welfare Executives, who argued that adoptions were
facilitated by whites-only maternity homes and abortions handled “by the
girls themselves or their families with no call on the taxpayers.”56 The “10
per cent” of pregnancies that befell women on welfare, consequently, were
“the ones that produce the cries of alarm,” and those tended – due to Jim
Crow’s devastating impact on education, economic opportunity, and
political power – to be black. 57
Yet, segregationists turned a blind eye to adoptions and abortions
in white communities, preferring instead to argue that “[southern whites]
are the only people in America who can testify to … the low moral level
of the Colored in marriage relationships.”58 According to the Virginia
Methodist Advocate, opposition to integration could be explained by the
“different moral standards” between the races, standards reflected in
“illegitimate births.”59 A Mississippi source agreed, holding that “[n]ot
more than 20 per cent of the Negroes are married … if you will pick out
ten Negro families and check the records, you will find that not over two
of them are actually legitimately married.”60
54
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The emphasis on marriage rates as a justification for segregation,
together with the use of marriage, or extra-marital motherhood as a means
of perpetuating it, helps to explain a wave of laws enacted across the
South in the 1950s that made marriage licenses increasingly difficult to
obtain. To take just a few examples, Mississippi enacted several bills in
1956 “designed to throw up a bulwark around the state’s segregation
laws,” including not only its ban on common law marriage but also a
requirement that all marriage licenses provide information on the
applicants, including their race, number of past marriages, and manner of
termination of past marriages.61 Further, the bill required that all data be
sent to the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of Health, a
measure that insured the new data would be tabulated.62 That same year,
Georgia declared that marriage licenses could only be granted by the
registrar, or his clerk, at the county courthouse, between the hours of 8
A.M. and 12 P.M.63 As an accommodation to working people, the act
declared that the clerk of court could also grant licenses at his personal
residence, no doubt a provision that catered to whites – who were
undoubtedly more comfortable approaching white homes after hours than
African Americans.64 One year later, Georgia further complicated the
process of requiring a marriage license by declaring that the dissolution of
previous marriages would no longer be presumed when an individual
applied for a marriage license.65 Instead, the applicant carried the burden
of proving that any prior marriages had been legitimately dissolved via
divorce.66 For those who did happen to be in a common law marriage,
such a measure made the prospect of remarrying significantly harder, if
not impossible.67
In 1957, North Carolina required that all newborns be registered
within five days of birth with the Central Office of Vital Statistics and that
a birth certificate be obtained for each child.68 Further, information
regarding the marital status of parents was to be included on each birth
certificate, meanwhile each certificate was then to be sent to the Central
Office of Vital Statistics, presumably for tabulation purposes.69 The
significance of birth certificates assumed an even more pronounced role in
Arkansas, where “no child” was “admitted to the first grade of any public
school of the state until the parent, guardian, or some other responsible
person has presented to the proper authorities such child’s birth
certificate.”70 Louisiana passed a similar rule, holding that “all children,
61
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upon entering the first grade of any school in the State of Louisiana shall
be required to present a copy of their official birth record to the school
principal.”71 Meanwhile, Louisiana passed a law that required individuals
applying for a marriage license to present certified copies of their original
birth certificates – along with medical documents dated within ten days of
the license application asserting that neither applicant was a carrier of
venereal disease.72
Though such regulations coincided with a larger effort to
document differences in “moral background” between the races, questions
emerged about how, precisely, whites were to escape such statistical nets.
This became apparent in North Carolina in 1959, when two state
legislators proposed a bill granting district attorneys the power to
prosecute unwed mothers for child abandonment. According to the
proposal, district attorneys would be provided with lists of illegitimate
births and would be required to investigate the parents responsible for
such births.73 D.A.’s would also receive lists of Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC) recipients and be required to investigate them for similar
violations.74 If the prosecutors happened to find that unwed parents were
misusing funds, they could charge them with a misdemeanor.75
Immediately, cries emerged from North Carolina’s white
community, particularly that portion of the community which dealt with
white adoptions.76 On May 12, 1959, for example, Galt Braxton, a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Children’s Home Society of
Greensboro, wrote to the chair of the House Health Committee
complaining that the bill made for bad policy.77 In particular, he
complained of the requirement that prosecutors be supplied with the
names and addresses of illegitimate children and their unwed mothers.
“Such a law,” argued Braxton would “brand” every “innocent child born
in North Carolina out of wedlock as illegitimate.”78 Rather than reduce
illegitimacy rates, this “would defeat efforts that have been in progress for
more than half a century to save such innocent youngsters by placing them
in reputable and proper homes.”79 Not only that, but the bill “would brand
every young woman in the State who unfortunately becomes an unwed
71
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mother and would put up the bars permanently for such a girl or young
woman to be redeemed to society and thereafter live a life worthwhile.”80
Given that North Carolina boasted few maternity homes for blacks,
Braxton’s message clearly aimed to alert the legislature to possible harm
the bill might cause whites.81 Further, Braxton’s concern that whites be
“redeemed” from their pre-marital affairs underscores the extent to which
southern invocations of morality proved only a partial substitute for color
as a basis for discrimination. Yet, this did not stop states from continuing
the project of using moral signifiers as vehicles for furthering repression.
To take just a few of the most outrageous examples, in 1958 Georgia
passed a voter registration act that enabled voters to register in two
different ways.82 Either they could read and write intelligibly a section of
the state or national constitution, or they could exhibit good character and
an understanding of the duties of citizenship by responding to a set of
questions.83 Due to persistent illiteracy caused by Jim Crow, most black
applicants chose to answer the questions despite the fact that the majority
of them were disqualified.84 Florida writer Stetson Kennedy commented
on these disqualifications, noting that arbitrary determinations of moral
character were often involved.85 “The purge procedure as evolved by
Georgia is simplicity itself,” argued Kennedy “You receive a legal
summons to appear before the county board of registrars at a specified
time … to ‘show cause’ why your name should not be dropped because of
‘bad character’ … If you fail to appear, your name is stricken; if you do
appear, it is usually stricken just the same.”86 Mississippi followed a
similar pattern, also looking to moral character as grounds for rejecting
applications to vote. This became apparent in 1960, when Mississippi
state representative Thompson McClellan introduced a resolution
requiring that voters be “of good moral character” in order to register, a
measure adopted by the Senate on April 28, 1960, and by the House a few
days later.87
Meanwhile, the Louisiana legislature submitted two constitutional
amendments to a statewide referendum limiting voting rights to those who
could establish good moral character.88 According to the statute, those
who had “lived with another in common law” marriage within five years
from the date of making application to become an elector,” and those who
80
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had “given birth to an illegitimate child within the five years immediately
prior to the date of making application for registration as an elector did not
possess good character.”89 The amendments, which were passed on
November 8, 1960, empowered county registrars to determine whether
individuals were either in common law marriages or had illegitimate
children.90
Not satisfied, Louisiana then punished unwed mothers by denying
them welfare benefits. In 1960, the state passed a bill denying welfare
benefits to an illegitimate child “if the mother of the illegitimate child in
question is the mother of two or more older illegitimate children.”91 Then,
the legislature enacted another statute denying public assistance “to any
person who is living with his or her mother if the mother has had an
illegitimate child after a check has been received from the welfare
department.”92 Almost immediately, the new measures “removed over a
quarter of Louisiana’s ADC recipients from the state’s welfare rolls by
eliminating the eligibility of 6,000 families with 22,500 children – 95
percent of whom were African American.”93
Florida engaged in a similar pogrom. Citing “the pressing problem
of illegitimacy,” Florida Governor LeRoy Collins recommended that
welfare be cut to children living in unsuitable homes.94 A home’s
suitability was determined by a set of vague criteria, each one capable of
disqualifying the recipient.95 For example, if children were left alone
while their parents engaged in “social activities or undesirable pursuits,”
Also, if parents engaged in
they could lose welfare benefits.96
promiscuous conduct “either in or outside the home” or had an illegitimate
child after receiving an assistance payment, they could lose support.97 Of
a total of 14,664 reports on unsuitable homes that were filed because of
the 1959 restrictions, 91 percent of these reports were filed against black
families, with the end result that 7,000 families and nearly 30,000 children
lost welfare funding.98
Though draconian, welfare cuts in Florida and Louisiana
epitomized a larger shift in southern law away from express references to
color and towards more subtle, manufactured notions of racial character,
even culture. North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges admitted as much
during a televised address on August 8, 1955, when he asserted that
89
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African Americans possessed “a new and rapidly developing culture,”
while whites retained an “older culture,” that threatened to be destroyed
under integrated conditions.99 “[U]nless we can, through good will and
pride in the integrity of our respective racial cultures,” argued Hodges,
“separate schools voluntarily,” then much of the progress made by both
cultures would be “undone.”100 Though Hodges did not define what,
precisely, he meant by culture, his words reverberated with claims made
by other, more extreme segregationists. To take just a few examples,
James Jackson Kilpatrick agreed that integration would lead to “the
decline of the only culture we know,” while Judge Thomas Pickens Brady
warned that wherever integration was attempted, “the white man, his
intellect, and his culture have died.”101 Such recurring allusions to culture
help explain the region-wide emphasis on illegitimacy rates, statistical
indicators of sexual behavior that segregationists used – even manipulated
– to prove that race was not simply a matter of cosmetic difference.102
Rather race could be measured, they argued, by looking at collective
sexual behavior, what they wanted to assert was in fact customary
behavior, or culture, thereby generating a color-neutral, moralist discourse
that both animated – and was animated by – state law. As the next section
will illustrate, segregationists carried this discourse to the national stage,
hoping to build bridges between the South and the nation.

III. SOCIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Even as southern states enacted increasingly racially-coded moral
regulations to preserve Jim Crow, so too did segregationists cobble
together a moralist campaign aimed at stirring resentment to integration
99
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nationally.103 Animating this campaign was a conviction that the South’s
fate hinged on pitching reasonable arguments to the “unprejudiced” minds
of enough voters in the North and West that Brown might be “effectively
modified or controlled by acts of Congress.”104 As one of the South
Carolina attorneys who argued against the NAACP in Brown put it in
1955, “[o]ur only hope at present lies not in the carrying on of the battle in
the courts” but rather in taking “the battle to the people and using the same
psychological and sociological warfare that has been so successfully
carried on against us.” 105
One place where segregationists hoped to take the battle to the
people, or at least their representatives, was Congress. There, prominent
Senators like Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland declared that
southerners had “to go into the North, and carry the fight into every
section of the United States.”106 “What divides the two areas of our
country,” posited Eastland, was “that in each area the people think that
those in the other area do not think as they do, when in reality we all think
alike.”107 To Eastland’s mind, all Americans possessed trepidation about
racial integration and – though few would openly endorse racism – most
could be persuaded to curtail the Supreme Court. In fact, Eastland
proposed an amendment to the Constitution in 1954 providing that “there
shall be preserved to the States full control of health, education, marriage,
and good order within a State.”108
Though few joined Eastland’s amendment, other prominent
southerners echoed his national appeal. To take just one example, Georgia
Senator Herman Talmadge took the very same arguments about
illegitimacy that had been stalking southern legislatures since 1954 to the
nation in 1959. On September 1, 1959, Talmadge declared that the
“mounting rate of illegitimacy” in America was approaching a “national
disgrace.”109 Carefully tracking southern efforts to cut welfare benefits to
illegitimate children, Talmadge “proposed that the Senate Committee on
Finance … undertake a thorough study of the relationship between the
alarming increase in illegitimacy and Federal policies governing welfare
assistance to dependent children.”110 He then entered reams of statistics
into the Congressional Record, documenting expenditures on illegitimate
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children by the federal government nationwide, including breakdowns of
those expenditures by race.111
Even as Talmadge and Eastland waged moral wars in the Senate,
so too did southerners wage “sociological warfare” in the House. To take
just one example, Mississippi Representative John Bell Williams mounted
a vigorous campaign in 1956 to sway popular opinion against integration
by focusing on crime statistics.112 In January of that year, Williams
entered into the Congressional Record evidence indicating that African
Americans committed five times as many murders as whites in
Washington DC and seven times as many rapes.113 Though such numbers
may have been inflated due to demographic shifts like white flight, not to
mention reporting bias, Williams glossed over scientific explanations for
his supposedly scientific data, preferring instead to make broad claims
about black inferiority. For example, he cited Federal Bureau of Prisons
data to argue that even though African Americans comprised only “10
percent” of the population in the United States in 1950, they committed
“more than half the homicides, both murder and manslaughter, in our
country.”114 Of course, Williams failed to mention that crimes committed
by whites, particularly crimes committed by whites in the South, tended to
go unpunished as evidenced by the murder of black teenager Emmett Till
in his own state of Mississippi only a year before, in 1955.115
Desperate to shift popular attention away from the murderous
tendencies of his own people, Williams organized a study of integrated
conditions in Washington D.C. schools, hoping to generate more statistics
on black inferiority. Using his position on a house subcommittee
dedicated to investigating delinquency in DC schools, Williams enlisted
the support of three white southern congressmen to generate a report that
grossly exaggerated problems related to integration.116 For example,
Williams began by claiming that there were “very few unusual
disciplinary problems in either” black or white schools prior to integration,
only to then conclude that desegregation had resulted in “appalling,
demoralizing, intolerable, and disgraceful” conditions.”117 Among these
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conditions were dubiously documented spikes in “fighting, lying,
stealing,” and “vandalism,” as well as factors that appeared to have little to
do with whether schools were integrated or segregated, like black
illegitimacy.118 Vaguely citing “sex problems” the committee asserted
that “[o]ne out of every four Negro children born in the District of
Columbia is illegitimate” and “that the number of cases of venereal
disease among Negroes of school age has been found to be astounding and
tragic.”119 Providing no real data on how such rates had been tabulated or
why they were even relevant, Williams moved quickly to the nowstandard segregationist argument that integrated schools would quickly
lead to interracial sex, a fear that in his words explained “the exodus of the
white residents of the District of Columbia.”120 Hoping that white flight
might provide a bridge-issue between whites in the North and South,
Williams concluded his report by recommending “that racially separate
public schools be reestablished for the education of white and Negro
pupils in the District of Columbia, and that such schools be maintained on
a completely separate and equal basis.”121
However, two members of the subcommittee, DeWitt Hyde and
A.L. Miller, refused to sign the final report, pointing to larger problems
with the way that Williams had marshaled his data.122 “The report seems
to blame all of the educational deficiencies in our school system entirely
on the efforts toward integration,” argued the two dissenters, who refused
to “believe that everything that is wrong with the educational system can
be blamed on integration.”123 Further, the objectors found methodological
problems with the way that the committee had conducted its hearings,
including reliance on “leading questions” and carefully “selected”
witnesses who ended up providing testimony that “does not appear to be
well-balanced, or objective, since persons with views not in accord with
those of the counsel were not given full and fair opportunity to testify.”124
Though little more than a smear campaign, Williams’s doctored
report indicates the extent to which segregationists like him went to link
integration, immorality, and delinquency in the post-Brown era. Signs that
such a move held out real advantages for the South emerged in other
places as well, including the archives of well-respected southern
moderates like Estes Kefauver.125 A Tennessee Senator who claimed to
support civil rights, Kefauver nevertheless became deeply interested in the
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degeneration of children, a subject that he pursued while heading the
Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency from 1955 to 1957.126
During his tenure, Kefauver initiated investigations into comic books,
television, motion pictures, and pornography, all with an eye to “the
impact of their respective products on juvenile behavior.”127
Though he never once mentioned race, Kefauver echoed
arguments made by segregationists like Williams, Talmadge and Eastland
about the vulnerability of children. In a speech on July 6, 1955, for
example, he proclaimed that children are “subject to a wide variety of
influences and conditions which tend to either lessen or increase [their]
chances of becoming delinquent.”128 Such influences included poor
family background, particularly parents who suffered from “financial lack,
health, or emotional handicaps.”129 Kefauver also emphasized the role
that schools played in child development, noting that they were the “only
social agency that comes in contact with every child,” and remained
“second only to the family in being responsible for preparing the child for
life.”130
Rather than push for the integration of public schools, however,
Kefauver focused instead on “exploring ways in which the Federal
Government can assist the States to strengthen and improve …
correctional institutions, juvenile detention centers, and juvenile police
bureaus.”131 Citing problems with funding and staff training, Kefauver
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articulated a federal role in juvenile justice, one that might be helpful in
“fortifying and strengthening” delinquency “institutions.”132 This interest
tracked the attention of other moderates in the South who viewed juvenile
justice as a critical part of the post-Brown paradigm, both as a means of
assuaging white fears that integration would damage their children, and as
a way of dealing with many of the behaviors that segregationists like John
Bell Williams had highlighted in Washington DC schools.133
Yet, Kefauver never drew a link between delinquency and
desegregation. Why? One possible explanation is that he enjoyed black
electoral support, and had been aided significantly by black voters in
defeating a “Crump machine” candidate in 1948.134 Another related
possibility is that Kevaufer, like Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson, harbored
aspirations of even higher office.135 Hoping for the White House,
Kefauver may have deliberately avoided open discussions of race to
secure not only black votes, but white votes in the North and West.136
Continuing along these lines, Kefauver worked carefully – perhaps more
carefully than others – to align his policy positions with moral campaigns
that mapped, but did not mention, race.
For example, during his time as head of the Subcommittee on
Juvenile Delinquency, Kefauver developed a committed interest in
fighting the evils of pornography. In 1955, Kefauver’s Committee made
“an investigation of pornography and the sale of pornographic literature to
juvenile delinquents.”137 The Committee then recommended that “the
shipment of indecent literature in interstate commerce be banned.”138 One
year later, Kefauver returned to the question of obscenity, this time issuing
a report entitled “Obscene and Pornographic Literature and Juvenile
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Delinquency.”139 In his conclusions, Kefauver called for “more stringent
penalties for violations of laws concerning pornography,” partly because
“the adolescent age group was the most susceptible to sexual
deviations.”140
Just as Kefauver raised the question of obscenity in the national
arena, so too did Tennessee officials like Memphis film censor Lloyd
Binford raise the question of obscenity at the local level – using it to ban
interracial films.141 To take just a few examples, Binford declared Island
in the Sun, a film starring Harry Belafonte and featuring an interracial
romance, obscene in 1957.142 Similar controversy exploded over I Spit on
Your Grave, a film about a “light-skinned black man” who exacts revenge
for his brother’s lynching by embarking on “multiple affairs with white
girls,” and the L-Shaped Room, about a “young pregnant white woman”
who enjoys “unexpected intimacy” with a “lonely [N]egro musician.”143
While Kefauver may have been motivated to control such films,
battling pornography provided him with more than simply an excuse for
suppressing interracial media, it also provided him with a facially-neutral,
politically viable rationale for joining his southern kinsmen in
dramatically curtailing the scope and reach of the Supreme Court. This
became apparent in 1959, when Kefauver joined James O. Eastland and
Herman Talmadge, both avid segregationists, in proposing an amendment
to the United States Constitution.144 Modeled after Eastland’s earlier
amendment removing power from the Court over questions of education,
order, and health, the new amendment proved more subtle, declaring
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simply that the rights of states to “decide on the basis of [their] own public
policy questions of decency and morality” be not “abridged.”145
The impetus for the law, according to Talmadge, was not Brown v.
Board of Education but another Supreme Court decision, Kingsley
International Picture Corp. v. Regents that declared states could not ban
films deemed “immoral.”146 The immoral movie in question was Lady
Chatterly’s Lover, a rendition of the novel by D.H. Lawrence that
recounted the tale of an English woman committing adultery with a
gardener.147 To Eastland’s mind, the ruling “struck a mortal blow to the
power of a State to maintain within its borders minimum standards of
decency and morality in the content of moving pictures offered for
exhibition.”148 Of course, the ruling also raised the larger question of state
regulation of morality generally, a field that had become increasingly
active since Brown. Though Eastland, Talmadge, and Kefauver probably
did not fear that Kingsley jeopardized the South’s increasingly complex
web of moral regulations on marriage, voting, schools, and public benefits,
they undoubtedly saw an opportunity to remove such laws from the
purview of the Supreme Court, guaranteeing a new era of racially-coded
Jim Crow.
Further, Kingsley allowed all three southerners – two staunch
segregationists and one moderate – to re-cast themselves in the role of
fervent champions of decency, a position that segregationists had worked
to occupy since Brown was decided in 1954. For example, Eastland
appropriated the same rhetoric that Kefauver did, declaring Kingsley a
boon for pornography even though the decision restricted itself to
questions of morality.149 “Something must be done,” proclaimed Eastland,
“to protect the children from these purveyors of filth and indecency in
films, books, magazines, and all other forms of communication media.”150
Though Kingsley had nothing to do with “purveyors of filth,” Eastland
found the ruling a convenient excuse for raising the more salient issue of
“the individual State and local community” being able to “set its standards
for morality and public decency.”151
Talmadge reiterated this point, positing that the amendment
removing moral regulations from the Court was necessary to combat other
145
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opinions as well. “The Supreme Court is famous for its ultraliberal
rulings,” lamented the Georgia Senator, “[b]ut freedom, under the Court’s
interpretation will wreck this Nation more quickly and more completely
than Kruschev and all his henchmen. History proves what happens to a
Nation that loses its moral standards.”152 Moral standards, southern state
legislatures agreed, pointed the way to a new era of state-enforced racial
inequality in the South. Not only were southern states rapidly exchanging
overtly racist laws for covertly racist moral regulations, but staunch
segregationists were beginning to intimate that massive resistance itself
was dead.
Indeed, just as Talmadge, Eastland, and Kefauver focused their
attention on an apparently innocuous amendment concerning morals; so
too did segregationist James Jackson Kilpatrick become interested in the
question of obscenity. Not only did he begin a book on the pornography
trade – The Smut Peddlers – but he also volunteered to serve on Virginia’s
state commission to rewrite its obscenity law. Why? One possibility, of
course, is that he arrived independently at the conclusion that pornography
was a growing threat to the welfare of the nation. Yet, Kilpatrick’s private
correspondence hinted at two slightly more subtle rationales. First,
Kilpatrick was already beginning to doubt the efficacy of massive
resistance. In a letter dated March 12, 1959, he confessed that any law
designed to thwart Brown which explicitly mentioned segregation or race
comprised little more than a “sitting duck for the guns of Federal
judges.”153 Further, any “plan” aimed at preserving segregation, reasoned
Kilpatrick, “never can succeed at all if it is tied in any way to the
integration controversy.”154 Here, from the pen of interposition’s architect,
was a call for subterfuge – just the kind of subterfuge that Eastland’s
amendment reserving moral regulations to the states represented. And,
here was an argument for making an appeal to the nation that might
actually work.
Three years earlier, Kilpatrick had held out a similar hope for
interposition, describing it as a viable theory of constitutional law that had
nothing, expressly, to do with race.155 Unfortunately for him, few agreed.
Rather than elevate southern discourse, interposition seemed to have
corrupted it, giving white extremists more bile to spew at the nation’s
highest tribunal. By 1959, that bile had sickened America: Little Rock
152
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remained a painful memory, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its judicial
supremacy, and massive resistance had entered a “thermidorean
reaction.”156 For Kilpatrick, who had long realized the South’s desperate
need to appeal to majority voters in the North and West, a new strategy
was needed, a new slogan that might unite the region with the rest of the
country, turning back the federal tide.157 Enter pornography. “I have
come down pregnant with another book,” wrote Kilpatrick in September
1959, “a serious, and I hope a thoughtful and a profitable book on the
obscenity racket.”158 Though he did not mention segregation or race,
familiar themes began to emerge between the new project and the old. As
Kilpatrick described it, the “heart and soul” of the pornography trade was
“not the grown-up sucker,” but “the curious child, the adolescent of
sixteen or seventeen receptive to a little dirty sex.”159 Citing one of
Kefauver’s committee reports on juvenile delinquency, Kilpatrick noted
that the officials questioned by the committee tended to agree “that lewd
photographs and magazines stimulate latent sexual desires among
adolescents and tend to trigger serious sex crimes.”160 Conceding that
concrete data proving obscenity caused delinquency was elusive,
Kilpatrick nevertheless invoked “common sense,” noting that “[b]etween
1948 and 1957 juvenile court cases increased by 136 percent while the
under-seventeen population [increased] by only 27 percent.”161 Then,
Kilpatrick referred to the Kefauver hearings, particularly testimony of
Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Cornell Dr. George W. Henry, who
agreed that children could “be sexually perverted by looking at, by
studying, and by dwelling upon photos” that were pornographic.162
Kilpatrick’s “common sense” view that obscenity encouraged
delinquency coincided with the equally common sense view that
integration encouraged delinquency, marking a tendency to view social
reform generally through the lens of degeneracy. Precisely because
pornography was increasingly considered a national threat to children – as
Kefauver claimed – Kilpatrick saw in it bridge possibilities, an
opportunity for communicating southern political positions to the nation,
much like interposition. After documenting the myriad harms that
156
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pornography caused youth, in other words, Kilpatrick concluded that a
localized, state-centered approach to the problem of porn made the most
sense – a position that coincided nicely with opposition to Brown. Citing
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Alberts v. California, he noted that
“Congress has no substantive power over matters of sexual morality” a
nod to the myriad moral regulations rapidly spreading through the
South.163 The only relevant constitutional provisions, he posited, were
Congressional powers “to establish post roads, to regulate commerce, and
to control goods imported into the country.”164 To Kilpatrick’s mind,
none of these were particularly relevant to obscenity, meaning that
“federal authority” was relatively “attenuated,” and that “the dangers of
federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the states may
do.”165 Instead, he argued, the states should take control. “The fifty
states,” argued Kilpatrick, “provide fifty experimental laboratories, in
which legislative bodies may experiment in different ways with the
treatment of social problems.”166 Acknowledging that certain states may
choose to ban material that had literary merit, Kilpatrick took a
remarkably federalist view. “If the state of Georgia sought to ban” a
particular work, he surmised, “the literati of Atlanta could pick up a copy
in New Orleans or New York, or order it by mail.”167 Presumably, the
same would be true if “the state of Georgia” chose to assign students to
schools based on attenuated notions of their moral character. Once
reduced to the conscience of the community, segregation might live again.
Yet, Kilpatrick remained cautious. Already aware of how sterling
arguments like interposition could be galloped through the mud, he took a
conservatively liberal stance on the question of obscenity. To his mind, a
second cultural conflict existed in the South, not a struggle between blacks
and whites, but a “war” as Kilpatrick described it, “between the Philistines
and the literati.”168 In this war, the Philistines – represented by the likes of
James Eastland and Herman Talmadge – consistently risked jeopardizing
the South’s politics by making those politics appear so histrionic that
voters in the North and West recoiled – just as they had recoiled when
extremists besmirched the legal theory of interposition. If the South was
to truly wage, and win, a new cultural war, believed Kilpatrick, it would
have to adopt a more educated tone, and acquire a more discerning taste.
The discriminators, literally, had to become more discriminating. “It is
this inability to discriminate, on the part of the Philistines,” wrote
Kilpatrick in The Smut Peddlers, “that has caused me so much trouble.”169
“The same unreasoning logic that alphabetizes Tortilla Flat and Turbulent
Daughters side by side in an NODL list,” he lamented, “sees a work of
163
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D.H. Lawrence, a dirty picture from Roy Oakley, and a contraceptive
device all brought to bar under the same” obscenity law.170 Such failures
to discriminate, he complained, make “no sense to me.”171
To rescue the South’s Philistines from themselves, Kilpatrick
advanced a moderate obscenity law for Virginia, meanwhile establishing a
fund for cultural uplift in the state. Perhaps ironically, he received a
donation for his fund from Harper Lee, one of the South’s most nationally
recognized authors.172 Just as Kilpatrick had feared, a local white school
board had embarrassed itself by banning Lee’s novel To Kill a
Mockingbird for being “immoral,” the same charge leveled at Lady
Chatterly’s Lover in Kingsley v. Regents.173 Outraged, Lee sent Kilpatrick
$10 to enroll the Hanover County, Virginia school board “in any first
grade of its choice.”174 Rather than an “immoral” celebration of
integration, lamented Lee, Mockingbird represented “a code of honor” that
was “the heritage of all Southerners,” an odd formulation given that the
book had come to be associated with the black struggle for civil rights, not
southern honor or history.175 Yet, Lee’s invocation of southern honor
implied that she too was interested in advancing a positive stereotype of
the white segregationist, a move exemplified by Lee’s lead character
Atticus Finch, an endearing lawyer who treated blacks with affection and
respect.176 That Lee enlisted Kilpatrick in a defense of her book
underscores the manner in which white cultural elites struggled to reframe
Jim Crow in a positive light, countering negative frames of segregationists
perpetuated by both white extremists and the civil rights movement. To
illustrate just how intensely movement activists and segregationists
engaged one another on cultural terrain, the next section will recover
direct exchanges between prominent segregationists like James Jackson
Kilpatrick and black proponents of civil rights like James Baldwin and
Martin Luther King, Jr., all over the question of stereotyping. Out of this
picture emerges a glimpse of the significance that popular culture played
in the struggle for civil rights. .

IV. CULTURAL EXCHANGE
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Lee’s frustration with Virginia extremists – the very whites who
banned her book in Hanover County – belied a larger struggle that the
white “literati” would wage in the 1960s to preserve a dignified defense of
segregation in the South. As this section will illustrate, the effort to
advance a culturally positive frame for Jim Crow suffered setbacks by
white extremists and black activists, including black “literati” who openly
challenged white claims to cultural supremacy. To take just a few
examples, in 1963 black author James Baldwin took on Kilpatrick in an
anthology commemorating the 100th anniversary of emancipation in
America, targeting segregationist efforts to advance negative black
stereotypes. “White people,” charged Baldwin, “will have to ask
themselves precisely why they found it necessary to invent [negative racial
stereotypes of African Americans] … meanwhile “[b]lack people will
have to do something very hard, too, which is to allow the white citizen
his first awkward steps toward maturity.” 177 – A clear slap in the face to
Kilpatrick and others who claimed that whites were culturally superior,
Baldwin’s allusion to white immaturity underscored the manner in which
black activists sought to invert racial stereotypes – in this case recasting
African Americans as superior to whites, a point that Baldwin sharpened
by suggesting blacks cure whites of their psychological shortcomings.
“We have, indeed,” Baldwin continued, subtly alluding to the
psychological data in footnote 11 of Brown, “functioned in this country in
precisely that way for a very long time – we were the first psychiatrists
here.”178 Baldwin’s reference to blacks as psychiatrists echoed Brown’s
reliance on psychiatry, even as it underscored a larger point, exemplified
in the title of his essay, that southern whites suffered psychological
dysfunction, a “White Problem,” as he put it, that African Americans
needed to help them with.179 Incensed, Kilpatrick responded to Baldwin’s
charge, but not before reading Baldwin’s Fire Next Time, which
deliberately challenged the segregationist claim that blacks suffered from
lower cultural standards than whites. “White people cannot, in the
generality,” wrote Baldwin, “be taken as models of how to live. Rather,
the white man is himself in sore need of new standards, which will release
him from his confusion and place him once again in fruitful communion
with the depths of his own being.”180 Indignant, Kilpatrick confessed to
being “shocked” that Baldwin did not want to adopt “the white man’s
cultural, social, religious, or moral values,” Kilpatrick countered briskly
that neither were whites “interested in adopting the Negro’s cultural,
social, religious, or moral values,” values that, in Kilpatrick’s prejudiced
view, had contributed little to Western Civilization since the days of
177
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slavery.181 Africa’s “phallic sculptures,” mocked Kilpatrick, “are truly
very fine phallic sculptures. Doubtless they are. The mud huts were the
strongest mud huts ever contrived … but if true, what then? Is a mud hut
a Monticello, a carved root a bust by Rodin?”182
Kilpatrick’s invocation of art and architecture to counter Baldwin
underscores the extent to which debates about culture infused the
discourse of civil rights in the 1960s. Direct action protest contributed to
these debates, often challenging segregationist stereotypes, pressing
theorists like Kilpatrick to amend – though not surrender – their cultural
positions. For example, during the student sit-ins of 1960, Kilpatrick
conceded that well-dressed, disciplined black college students posed a
challenge to white stereotypes of black cultural inferiority, even inverting
them, making whites look backward and uncivilized. “Many a Virginian
must have felt a tinge of wry regret,” wrote Kilpatrick in 1960, “in reading
of Saturday’s ‘sitdowns’ by Negro students in Richmond stores. Here
were the colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties and one of them was
reading Goethe and one was taking notes from a biology text. And here,
on the sidewalk outside, was a gang of white boys come to heckle, a
ragtail rabble, slack-jawed, black-jacketed, grinning fit to kill, and some of
them, God save the mark, were waving the proud and honored flag of the
Southern States in the last war fought by gentlemen. Eheu! It gives one
pause.”183 Kilpatrick’s disappointment with the poor behavior of white
hecklers – the very philistines that he and Harper Lee loathed – pointed to
the manner in which direct action protest inverted racial stereotypes of
black cultural inferiority. Black demonstrators deliberately upset such
stereotypes, purposely remaining non-violent, intentionally embarrassing
their white counterparts, and, as Kilpatrick noted in Richmond, even
appropriating elite cultural markers – in this case Goethe – something that
the white “rabble” eschewed.
Aware of the manner in which such protest could either challenge
or reinforce stereotypes, black activist James Lawson stressed the
importance of maintaining a particular cultural image to the success of
direct action protest. One of the leaders of the student sit-ins in Nashville,
Lawson advised women who wanted to participate in demonstrations to
wear stockings and heels, while men should don coats and ties.184 John
Lewis, who also worked with Lawson, routinely handed out rules of
engagement to student demonstrators that focused not only on dress, but
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manners, including directives that students remain courteous, sit straight
while at the counter, and refrain from cursing.185
As black demonstrators deliberately enlisted cultural practice,
language, dress, and so on, white voices joined Kilpatrick in lamenting the
precise manner in which the sit-ins exposed white cultural deficiencies.
“[S]outhern white people are human,” exclaimed Georgia Senator Richard
Russell on Feb 27, 1960, “[t]hey feel that they are being baited like
animals … what is more, they feel that they are being baited for political
purposes … they are sensitive; this is no time to be trying to provoke a
race riot.”186 Russell’s confession that southern whites were easily baited
– “like animals” – hinted at an insecurity that gripped elite southerners, an
insecurity that the white South generally could not, in fact, live up to its
pretensions of cultural superiority. If black demonstrators continued
exposing those pretensions, both Kilpatrick and Russell feared that
national attitudes towards the region might shift, in favor of civil rights. “I
know who will be blamed for it,” claimed Russell in reference to the
violence that the sit-ins risked provoking from “sensitive” southern whites,
“I know who will be denounced all over the country. It will be the white
people of the South.”187
To bolster whitelegitimacy, Russell turned to personal morality,
underscoring the link between civil rights and sex. “Why do not the
newspapers that constantly criticize [the South],” argued Russell, “‘advise
our Negro friends to do something to improve themselves” including
“reduce their illegitimacy from 10 times that of the rest of the country to 5
times.”188 Russell’s charge resonated with arguments made by other
segregationists, including Citizens’ Council leader Tom Brady that
“obscenity and depravity” permeated black culture and justified Jim
Crow.189 Of course, such malevolent portrayals of black life as obscene
belied segregationists’ own efforts to artificially exaggerate the extent of
black degeneracy, something that the Mississippi legislature attempted by
invalidating common law marriage. Further, segregationist attempts to
portray black culture as sexually licentious did little to assuage their own
fears that a majority of whites might in fact be more than happy to mix
socially and romantically with blacks under integrated conditions.
Such fears became apparent in 1957, when Twentieth Century Fox
released a film entitled Island in the Sun about two interracial couples, one
a black revolutionary on a Caribbean island played by Harry Belafonte
who finds himself pursued by an elite white woman played by Joan
185
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Fontaine, and the other a white suitor who declares his love for black
actress Dorothy Dandridge.190 Both relationships disturbed segregationists
in Memphis so much that they declared the film “offensive to moral
standards” and censored it, a move replicated in other cities across the
South.191 Of course, such outright declarations of interracial relations as
obscene violated constitutional law, even as they underscored the manner
in which obscenity itself became part of a larger discourse on race, rights,
and sex.
Picking up on the same discourse that had driven states like
Mississippi and North Carolina to tinker with illegitimacy rates, for
example, Richard Russell argued that Congress “should put a stop to this
business of establishing relief programs that encourage illegitimacy,” even
as he leveled his guns at civil rights leaders who also happened to be
ministers, a clear attempt to counter the “moral” message of Martin Luther
King, Jr., Andrew Young, and others.192 “Why do the Negro preachers
not do something,” queried Russell, “about unfortunate conditions such as
I have mentioned?”193
Of course, black preachers involved in the civil rights movement
focused on obtaining civil rights, not reducing out-of-wedlock births – an
issue that should have had little to do with constitutional rights. Yet, even
high-ranking black activists like King recognized the manner in which
white segregationists would, and did, use questions of sexual culture to
undermine black constitutional positions. “When the white man argues
that segregation should continue because of the Negro’s lagging
standards,” argued Martin Luther King, Jr., in Stride Toward Freedom, his
memoir of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, “he fails to see that standards
lag because of segregation.”194 “The ‘behavior deviants’ within the Negro
community,” explained King, referring to illegitimacy and crime rates,
“stem from the economic deprivation, emotional frustration, and social
isolation which are the inevitable concomitants of segregation.”195
Despite King’s awareness that differences in standards had little to do with
innate racial traits, he conceded that the question of standards was so
linked to the question of legal rights in the South that improving black
standards – even though they had nothing to do with formal, constitutional
claims – could in fact have a constitutional effect. “By improving our
standards here and now,” wrote King, “we will go a long way toward
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breaking down the arguments of the segregationist.”196 “[W]e must work
on two fronts,” asserted King in his Montgomery memoir, “On the one
hand, we must continue to resist the system of segregation which is the
basic cause of our lagging standards; on the other hand we must work
constructively to improve the standards themselves. There must be a
rhythmic alteration between attacking the causes and healing the
effects.”197
King’s awareness of the standards/rights link derived directly from
his experience in Montgomery. In fact, leaders in Montgomery had
wrestled with the cultural contingency of rights since at least 1955, when
an African American woman named Claudette Colvin refused to give up
her seat on a city bus.198 Interested in launching a test case challenging
Montgomery’s segregated transportation system, local civil rights leaders
Edgar Daniel (E.D.) Nixon and Jo Ann Robinson considered using Colvin
as a plaintiff, only to reject the idea once they discovered that she was
pregnant and single, her own mother confessing that her daughter had
“done took a tumble.”199 Shortly thereafter, another African American
woman – Mary Louise Smith – also refused to give up her seat to a white
on a Montgomery bus, only to be rejected because of her “family
background,” particularly her father’s alcoholism.200 As E.D. Nixon later
put it, if reporters came out to interview the Smith family, “we wouldn’t
have a leg to stand on.”201
Cultural considerations pushed movement leaders to advance the
case of Rosa Parks, a longtime member of the local NAACP, and
Claudette Colvin’s NAACP Youth Council mentor.202 Unlike Colvin and
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Smith, Parks had no illegitimate children and nohistory of familial
alcoholism, a quality that, as irrelevant as it should have been to basic
citizenship, made her better suited, culturally, to bring a constitutional
case.203 According to Jo Ann Robinson, “Mrs. Parks had the caliber of
character we needed to get the city to rally behind us.”204
Just as Rosa Parks satisfied the invisible cultural requirements
needed to claim constitutional rights, so too did the college students that
participated in the sit-ins of 1960 challenge the cultural presumptions
bolstering black repression and white supremacy. “Newspaper and
television accounts of the sit-ins,” noted black activist James Farmer,
“suggested a picture which reversed the common stereotypes. Inside, at
the lunch counters, sat well-dressed, well-mannered Negro college
students with their calculus and philosophy books, quietly asking for a cup
of coffee; outside, crowds of white boys with duck-tail haircuts and leather
jackets grinned and shuffled their feet and tried to start trouble.”205 That
hair-styles, clothing, and other distinctly cultural attributes factored into
the significance of civil rights demonstrations reveals the cultural
contingency of rights in the 1960s, a subtext rarely acknowledged by
constitutional scholars of the period.

Yet, Kilpatrick continued to hammer the question of illegitimacy.
“[T]he rate of illegitimacy among American Negroes creeps steadily,” he
wrote in1963,, “toward the point at which one of every four Negro babies
will be born in bastardy.”206 Conceding that “the white man is no paragon
of virtue,” Kilpatrick maintained that beneath the legalist debate over
constitutional rights lay a much larger debate over culture and behavior.
“We are talking of manners,” he posited, “of civility, of sobriety, of
restraints upon carnality.”207
Even as he worked to preserve a link between “carnality” and
Constitutional Law, so too did Kilpatrick express further outrage at the
movement’s tactics, particularly its deliberate provocation of white
violence in places like Greensboro and Birmingham. This became
particularly apparent when Kilpatrick read Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
second memoir, about the Birmingham protest, Why We Can’t Wait.
“The work should be required reading in every police department in the
nation,” fumed Kilpatrick, “Here Dr. King spells it out, with impersonal
detachment, just how these things work: Committees must be organized,
203
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and schedules must be arranged of persons to be arrested; the police must
be provoked into acts of brutality, calculated to look good on television
(he recalls that his demonstration in Birmingham almost failed two years
ago, when the police were at first too polite and cheerful).”208 Though
appalled at the manner in which King had successfully manipulated white
authorities, Kilpatrick expressed a begrudging admiration for the
“reverend doctor.”209 “One does not have to admire the techniques of
Martin Luther King,” he wrote, “to respect his mastery of them.”210 To his
mind, King possessed “a certain genius in timing, showmanship, publicity
management, administrative leadership, and the ability to influence the
opinions of others.”211 Of course, Kilpatrick had himself attempted to
influence the opinions of others since at least the beginning of his
interposition campaign in 1956. Yet, King proved more successful, so
successful in fact that the Birmingham demonstrations pushed Kilpatrick
to confess that the white governor of the state, rather than a paragon of
cultural superiority, was “an idiot.”212
Kilpatrick would concede ground again, after the movement staged
another round of successful demonstrations in Selma, Alabama during the
spring of 1965. After months of buildup, black protesters launched a
march across Selma’s Edmund Pettus Bridge only to be physically stopped
by Alabama police who, in a well-televised sequence, gassed, clubbed,
and horse-whipped them back across the Alabama River.213 One week
later, northern activist Viola Liuzzo was shot by members of the Ku Klux
Klan, prompting even Kilpatrick to express profound regret.214 “Those of
us who have lived all our lives in the South, and loved the South
abidingly” lamented Kilpatrick, “must feel the stain of Alabama like a
wound … [t]he South has many needs,” he continued, “but perhaps the
greatest of these is its need to recognize more clearly its membership in
the American union … They had moral rights and constitutional rights,”
he wrote of Liuzzo and Reverend James Reeb, also killed by the Klan,
“And Governor, it was the first duty of State and local government to
make those rights secure.”215
Chastened by philistines in Alabama, Kilpatrick stood by
helplessly as Congress enacted a robust voting rights bill, a law that would
ultimately empower the federal government to strike down unreasonable
208
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restrictions on voting, including the kinds of restrictions that
disenfranchised unwed mothers in Georgia and Louisiana. “[U]nder the
Constitution,” complained Kilpatrick, “each State clearly has the power
‘to determine the qualifications of electors,’” a reality that neither
Congress nor the President seemed interested in upholding, as they
“trampled” the nation’s founding document “underfoot.”216
Yet,
Kilpatrick’s whimpers won few listeners. The violence in Selma
galvanized national opinion against southern recalcitrance, closing the
curtain on constitutionally strained arguments about racial standards,
illegitimacy rates, and cultural “shortcomings” – at least for the moment.

V. PERFECT AMMUNITION
Though muted by Selma, segregationist discourses on race and
culture reemerged later that year, after an unforeseen explosion in
California. On August 12, 1965, one week after Lyndon Johnson signed
the Voting Rights Act into law, the Los Angeles Times reported an
altercation between an African American male and a Los Angeles police
officer in the heavily black L.A. neighborhood of Watts.217 The officer,
while trying to arrest twenty-one year old Marquette Frye for drunk
driving, also subdued Frye’s mother, triggering sporadic rock-throwing
and violence.218 By 10:00 p.m. that night, eighty police officers had been
deployed to cordon off a sixteen block area. Unrest continued through the
following day as black youth attacked police and passersby, burning cars
and throwing rocks.219 By nightfall, papers reported crowds of up to 7,000
in the streets; stores looted and cars burned. Over three hundred police,
sheriffs, and highway patrolmen were deployed to quell the disorder as
fires erupted and firefighters were shot at, leaving entire city blocks
burning out of control.220 According to one account, “the 150-block
section of Los Angeles last night took on the appearance of a war zone
with men crouching in the shadows, streets littered with debris or
completely torn up, store windows broken and scorched and a pall of
smoke hanging over the area.”221 Six days, thirty-four deaths, and 4,000

216

James Jackson Kilpatrick, “A Conservative View,” March 20/21, 1965, Special
Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
217
Arrest Causes Near Riot in Negro Area of Coast, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 12, 1965,
15.
218
Arrest Causes Near Riot in Negro Area of Coast, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 12, 1965,
15.
219
7,000 In New Rioting; Troops Alerted, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 13, 1965, 1.
220
Eight Men Slain: Guard Moves In, LOS ANGELES TIMES, August 14, 1965, 1.
221
Youths Run Wild in Negro Section: Smash Cars, Set Fires and Attack Passers-by –
Their Victims are of Both Races, NEW YORK TIMES, August 14, 1965, 8.

35

arrests after it began, one of the largest riots in American history drew to a
close.222
Stunned, President Johnson appointed former Central Intelligence
Agency director John McCone to investigate the causes of the unrest.223
Before McCone had time to issue a report, however, critics pounced. On
August 14, 1965, three days after the arrest of Marquette Fry and in the
middle of the rioting, the Los Angeles Times printed a story asserting that
the cause of the riots was not police brutality, poor housing, or lack of
opportunity but a breakdown in the black family. “The administration,”
asserted the article, “is redirecting its main focus on racial problems from
the South to large urban areas as the result of an unpublished Labor
Department report that blames Negro unrest on the breakdown of the
Negro family structure.”224 The report to which the Los Angeles Times
referred was an in-house memo drafted by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the
Director of the Department of Labor’s Office of Policy Planning and
Research.225
Apparently unaware of the extensive debate over
illegitimacy that had simmered in the South since Brown, Moynihan took
illegitimacy and divorce rates in the North and recast them not as
symptoms of economic inequality – which black sociologist Franklin
Frazier claimed they were – but causes of economic inequality.226 “As the
result of family disorganization,” asserted Moynihan, “a large proportion
of Negro children and youth have not undergone the socialization which
only the family can provide … family disorganization has been
particularly responsible for a large amount of juvenile delinquency and
adult crime among Negroes,” a point that papers like the Times would use
to suggest a cause of the riots.227 Further, Moynihan posited that the
primary source of familial “disorganization” was not racism but “the
failure of the [black] father to play the role in family life required by
American society, the mitigation of this problem must await those changes
in the Negro and American society which will enable the Negro father to
play the role required of him.”228
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Moynihan’s report constituted a dramatic counterpoint to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, which had argued that segregation
damaged black youth, not black fathers. Yet, the Wall Street Journal
printed an article on August 16, 1965, declaring the Moynihan report to be
an explanation for the Watts riot. “Behind the past week’s orgy of Negro
rioting,” extolled the Journal, “lies a sickness that all the new civil rights
legislation is powerless to cure in the foreseeable future – the spreading
disintegration of Negro family life in the big cities of the North and
West.”229 According to the Journal, “the rioters who by yesterday had
brought death to 31 people and injuries to another 676 and who had
burned an estimated $175 million worth of property, including entire
blocks, in Los Angeles were not protesting any specific civil rights
grievances. They were primarily young hoodlums lashing out against
society … A growing army of such youths is being bred in the Negro
sections of cities across the country by broken homes, illegitimacy, and
other social ills that have grown steadily worse in recent decades.”230 The
Journal’s emphasis on broken homes led directly to the citation of black
illegitimacy rates. “The breakdown of family life,” continued the Journal,
“can be glimpsed in nearly any set of Negro social statistics nationwide …
In New York City’s Harlem, for instance, where Negro rioting flared for a
week last year, it’s estimated one of every five Negro children born is
illegitimate. An indication of the social evils this breeds: Researchers in
one Harlem district not long ago found venereal disease running at 2,143
cases per 100,000 people … Against this background the Los Angeles
explosion begins to come a bit clearer. Otherwise it might seem
inexplicable.”231
The Journal’s turn to black illegitimacy rates as a cause of rioting
proved a haunting parallel to southern discourses on black moral
shortcomings work-shopped across the South since the 1950s. Indeed,
James Jackson Kilpatrick himself had focused on such rates in the
aftermath of Birmingham in 1963.232 Now, he reentered the debate, this
time writing for a nationally syndicated column called “A Conservative
View.” “Say what you will about the South,” proclaimed Kilpatrick, “the
American Negro has had two generations of reasonable opportunity in the
un-segregated North and West. How has he developed the opportunities
put before him? In squalor, in apathy, in crime, in cadging off ‘the
229
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welfare,’ in dropping out of integrated schools, [and] in breeding swarms
of children out of wedlock. This is the sorry record. And now, in Los
Angeles, we witness barbarian hordes”233 Once ashamed of white
delinquents acting out at lunch counters, Kilpatrick rejoiced over blacks
rioting in Watts. “Outside the South,” wrote Kilpatrick in September
1965, “this autumn also sees a changing mood, far more abrupt, much
easier to read. The sacking of Los Angeles marked high water in the long
suffering tolerance of the American people for the criminal excesses of a
Negro minority.”234
Kilpatrick’s mention of a changing mood belied a larger discursive
convergence, at least within conservative circles, between segregationist
discourses of race and national explanations for riots. On August 18,
1965, for example, conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak also cited the Moynihan Report. “Weeks before the Negro ghetto
of Los Angeles erupted in violence,” wrote Evans and Novak for the New
York Times, “intense debate over how to handle such racial powder kegs
was under way deep inside the Johnson administration.”235 The “pivot” of
this debate, they continued, was the Moynihan Report, “a much
suppressed, much leaked Labor Department document that strips away
usual equivocations and exposes the ugly truth about the big-city Negro’s
plight.”236 Evans and Novak framed the report as something that the
Johnson administration was reluctant to openly endorse. “[W]hen
Moynihan wanted to release the report,” they asserted, “he was stopped by
his boss, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz. In private conversation,
Wirtz expressed the fear that evidence of Negro illegitimacy would be
grist for racist propaganda mills.”237
The idea that Moynihan’s report might bolster southern critiques of
black rights was not lost on the White House. Others within the Johnson
administration expressed similar views. Special assistant and counsel to
the president Harry McPherson recounted an argument with Moynihan
over possible southern responses. “I was afraid that it was going to be
perfect ammunition for the Southerners,” explained McPherson later, “I
could imagine Holmes Alexander or someone like that writing a mocking
piece, ‘Aha, I told you so. They’re all a bunch of bastards and immoral
people!”238
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Despite McPherson’s warnings, Moynihan continued to push his
report, and the White House went along. President Lyndon Johnson
himself referenced black illegitimacy rates during a speech at Howard
University on June 5, 1965 – penned by Moynihan.239 “Perhaps most
important,” pronounced Johnson, “is the breakdown of the Negro family
structure … [o]nly a minority – less than half – of all Negro children reach
the age of 18 having lived all their lives with both of their parents. At this
moment, tonight, little less than two-thirds are at home with both of their
parents. Probably a majority of all Negro children receive federally-aided
public assistance sometime during their childhood.”240 Though Johnson
claimed that “white America” was partly to blame for the disintegration of
the black family, some saw a more strategic motive behind his reference to
illegitimacy rates.241 As Lee Rainwater put it, Johnson’s adoption of
Moynihan’s report gave him a way to “leap-frog” the civil rights
movement, to take the moral high ground from blacks and return it to
whites, providing the administration with a rhetorical tool for countering
increasingly radical movement demands.242
Whether he was aware of segregationist strategy in the South or
not, Moynihan placed the question of black marital customs, and
consequently black culture, at the forefront of the national racial debate,
revivifying Christian defenses of Jim Crow. Once battered by Selma,
southern segregationists rallied, joining Moynihan’s chorus on the floor of
the Senate. “Dear Citizens,” began a letter introduced by South Carolina
Senator Strom Thurmond into the Congressional Record in the wake of
the L.A. riots, “No society or nation is stronger than the homes that make
up that nation or society. Until every man and woman is willing to stand
before God and his neighbors and say: ‘We are united ‘til death do us
part,’ and every parent is willing to say: ‘You are my child until death do
us part,’ we as a nation will find our Government corrupt. Democracy,
values, sharing, and respect for the rights of human beings must be taught
and learned at home.”243 West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd agreed.
239

LEE RAINWATER AND WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE POLICY REPORT 125
(1967).
240
Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These
Rights,” June 4, 1965, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER AND WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE POLICY REPORT 125 (1967)..
241
Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These
Rights,” June 4, 1965, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER AND WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE POLICY REPORT 125 (1967)..
242
LEE RAINWATER AND WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE POLICY REPORT 14,
274, 284, 291-93 (1967).
243
Letter from Lillie Schuster to Strom Thurmond, Aug. 8, 1965, entered into the
Congressional Record by Strom Thurmond, A Strong Home is a Strong Nation,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 24, 1965, A4720.

39

Lamenting the “5-day orgy of rioting, murder, racial battling, setting fires,
looting, and wanton destruction of property” in Los Angeles, Byrd stood
before Congress and called for family planning.244 “[F]amily planning is
imperative,” he announced, “and civil rights organizations should make
intensive efforts to promote such. The high birth rate among low-income
Negro families simply cannot be overlooked.”245
“Additionally,”
continued Byrd, “the problem of illegitimacy must be dealt with. In New
York City’s Harlem, where Negro rioting flared last year, one out of every
five Negro children is illegitimate.”246
Though Byrd’s tendency to link illegitimacy to riots was not
particularly surprising for a southerner, more surprising was Moynihan’s
agreement, months after his report was completed. “From the wild Irish
slums of the nineteenth century European seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs
of Los Angeles,” wrote Moynihan on September 18, three weeks after
Byrd’s statement before the Senate, “there is one unmistakable lesson in
American history; a community that allows a large number of men to grow
up in broken families, dominated by women … that community asks for
and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disorder – most particularly the
furious, unrestrained lashing out at the whole social structure – that is not
only to be expected; it is very near inevitable. And it is richly
deserved.”247 No longer ignorant of southern claims, Moynihan joined
them, marking a rare North/South, bipartisan convergence on the question
of race and culture in the 1960s, a convergence that liberals would fight,
desperately, to unravel in the courts.
Even as Johnson officials like Moynihan joined segregationists in
targeting illegitimacy as an explanation for urban unrest – more
sympathetic voices responded, arguing that illegitimates should be
protected from the “disabilities and moral prejudices” facing them.248 One
such liberal was Harry Krause, an associate professor of law at the
University of Illinois, who proposed a Uniform Act on Legitimacy to
counter state discrepancies – like those that had emerged in the South in
the 1950s.249 In 1966, Krause joined Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in a challenge to an illegitimacy rule in Louisiana. The
case, styled Levy v. Louisiana, dealt with a claim by five illegitimate
children demanding compensation for the wrongful death of their unwed
mother.250 In their brief, NAACP attorneys Greenberg and Leroy Clark
posited that “classification by the criterion of illegitimacy, which appears
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to be racially neutral on its face,” was in fact “covert racial
discrimination.”251 Recognizing that whites possessed ways to hide their
illegitimate births, Greenberg and Clark confirmed that “a very high
percentage of white illegitimate children are adopted, thereby achieving
status under the Wrongful Death Act with regard to their adoptive parents,
whereas nearly no Negro children find adoptive parents.”252 Consequently
“95.8 percent of all persons affected by discrimination against
illegitimates under the statute are Negroes.”253 To make matters worse,
both Greenberg and Clark recognized that southern states like Louisiana
and Mississippi had resorted to punitive welfare regulations in the
aftermath of Brown, including the criminalization of “[c]onceiving and
giving birth to two or more illegitimate children,” an offense that could
garner as much as a $1000 fine or a year in jail.254
The Supreme Court, led by Justice William O. Douglas, sided with
the NAACP.255 To deny illegitimates the same benefits that went to those
with married parents, held the Court, violated equal protection.256 This
holding, which boldly carved out new law, indicated that the Court was
beginning to see illegitimacy in the same way that Greenberg did, as the
next phase in the struggle for civil rights.257 Greenberg made this explicit
in his brief, which posited that “the psychological effect of the stigma of
bastardy upon its victim seems entirely comparable to the damaging
psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination,” an
argument that had formed the basis of the Court’s equal protection claim
in Brown.258 Here, southern recalcitrance backfired, pushing the Supreme
Court to create “new doctrine,” particularly in the realm of equal
protection.259
The Court took equal protection even farther in an Alabama case,
also derived from southern turns to moral regulation. In King v. Smith, the
Court struck down “man-in-the-house” rules, measures denying welfare
benefits to children who lived in the same household as a man not their
father.260 At the time, “state welfare policies had to be approved by what
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was then called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,” an
agency that traditionally approved man-in-the-house rules because they
precluded welfare fraud (if a man was in the house, reasoned the
government, then he could support the family).261 Though eight of nine
Justices argued that the “applicable statute” prevented denials of funds,
Douglas rounded out the unanimous vote against the rules, pronouncing
them a violation of equal protection.262
One year later, Thurgood Marshall dealt forthrightly with the
question of law’s role in regulating morality in Stanley v. Georgia, a
southern case involving the seizure of pornography in a Georgia man’s
home, resulting in an arrest for obscenity possession.263 Though the Court
had confronted a similar fact pattern eight years earlier in Mapp v. Ohio, it
had avoided the obscenity issue, ruling instead against the police search as
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.264 In Stanley, Marshall took the
question of pornography head-on, holding that “the mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.”265
Though obscenity had clearly been divorced from First Amendment
protections in earlier rulings, Marshall imposed a tenuous distinction,
noting that [t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness,” therefore protecting the right to
possess any material, no matter how prurient, in “the privacy of a one’s
own home.”266
Though Marshall did not mention race, he had long chafed at the
South’s effort to use “morality arguments” against black rights,
particularly its claims “that Negroes have higher ratios of illegitimacy,
immorality and venereal disease.”267 Now, he struck directly at the ability
of southern states to regulate morals, engaging segregationists on the same
cultural terrain that they had used, through constitutional amendment and
otherwise, to build national support for curtailing federal judicial power.
Further, the case involved the pornography collection of a southern white
plaintiff – a subtle jab at segregationist pretensions of cultural superiority
mobilized since Brown.
Outraged, moralist voices lobbied President Nixon to investigate
the matter, prompting him to assign a Commission to study the problem of
obscenity. In 1970 the President’s “Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography,” concluded that the Court’s three part test for obscenity,
including whether material “appears to the ‘prurient’ interest of the
average person,” “is ‘patently offensive’ in light of ‘community
standards,’” and “lacks redeeming social value,” did not actually “provide
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meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries or courts.”268
Consequently, “distinctions” between “prohibited and permissible
materials” had become hopelessly confused, leading to “interference with
the communication of constitutionally protected materials.”269
Not quite the repudiation of Stanley that conservatives had hoped,
Nixon achieved more success by replacing liberals on the Court. In 1969
he replaced Earl Warren with Warren Burger, and in 1972 he successfully
appointed Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William Rehnquist, both conservatives
with questionable commitments to civil rights.
With Powell and
Rehnquist on board, the Court took a quick right turn, particularly on
questions of obscenity. For example, in a 1973 case styled Miller v.
California, the new Court ruled that the regulation of obscene materials
should indeed revert to the states, just as segregationists had long argued.
“We emphasize,” opined the Court, “that it is not our function to propose
regulatory schemes for the States.”270 Rather, “community standards”
should determine whether literature, and for that matter speech, was
obscene; independent of “national” norms.271
While Miller did not overturn Levy or King, it coincided with a
second ruling that dramatically changed the way the Court perceived race,
shifting its emphasis away from compensation for past harm and towards a
new celebration of racial/cultural difference. Styled Regents v. Bakke, the
case vindicated a white plaintiff who complained that the University of
California Davis had rejected his application to medical school in lieu of
less qualified black applicants who were perceived to be
“disadvantaged.”272 Holding that “[t]he concept of discrimination is
susceptible of varying interpretations,” Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. – a
native of Richmond, Virginia – made the remarkable claim that it was
impossible to determine whether blacks had suffered any more “societal
injury” or “societal discrimination” than whites.273 Indeed, whites
themselves constituted a conglomeration of “various minority groups,”
argued Powell, including “Celtic Irishmen,” “Austrian resident aliens,”
and “white Anglo-Saxon Protestants,” many of whom “can lay claim to a
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State.”274
At first glance absurd, Powell’s re-characterization of whites as an
assemblage of suffering minorities actually echoed claims that white
southerners – of whom Powell was one – had long made.275 Indeed, white
suffering became, as we have scene, the crux of segregationist arguments
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about integration and culture.276 In a manner that dovetailed nicely with
these arguments, Powell brokered a compromise that effectively shut the
door on making “societal discrimination” a constitutional priority, turning
instead to the cultural frame of diversity as a preferred category of
constitutional analysis.277 Here, Powell scored points with liberals even as
he revivified longstanding segregationist claims that blacks and whites
were fundamentally, culturally, different.278 Not only did blacks possess
different “ideas,” posited Powell, but they also possessed different
“mores” a clear allusion to the types of cultural arguments that
segregationists like James Jackson Kilpatrick had made since the 1950s.279
Though Powell had disagreed with Kilpatrick’s endorsement of
interposition in 1956, he canonized the discourse of race and culture in
1978, a move that was not lost on veterans of civil rights like Thurgood
Marshall.280 “[I]t is more than a little ironic,” argued Marshall in his
dissenting opinion in Bakke, “that, after several hundred years of classbased discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”281 Equating
Powell’s opinion in Bakke to Plessy v. Ferguson, Marshall lamented that
“I fear we have come full circle. After the Civil War … this Court, in …
Plessy v. Ferguson, destroyed the movement toward complete equality …
Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative
action programs.”282

CONCLUSION
As Marshall’s dissent in Bakke implies, massive resistance
comprised only one aspect of the South’s struggle against civil rights in
the 1950s and 60s. More insidious was a campaign rooted in notions of
sexual morality and culture, a struggle that invoked seemingly unrelated
discursive constructs of family, marriage, illegitimacy, even pornography.
State regulations of such constructs followed, as public officials struggled
to perpetuate Jim Crow in facially neutral ways, meanwhile working to
build a constitutional coalition with moral conservatives in the North and
West. Cognizant of such discursive moves, civil rights activists
responded, deliberately engaging segregationists on explicitly cultural
terrain, forcing concessions from architects of interposition like James
Jackson Kilpatrick – who abandoned massive resistance in favor of tacit
endorsements of black rights.
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Yet, even as segregationists jettisoned defiance, so too did they
intensify discursive invocations of culture to steal the movement’s moral
high ground. Hence, by 1960 Kilpatrick had embarked on a crusade
against pornography which, by 1965, evolved into a full-scale assault on
the black family – an assault joined by conservatives across the country in
the aftermath of the Watts riots. By recovering such discursive moves, we
catch a glimpse of previously unrecognized “processes of Constitutional
decision-making,” particularly efforts to restrain the Court by building
popular conservative coalitions. Meanwhile, we gain a stark look at the
fundamental ways in which constitutional rights are themselves culturally
contingent, dependant on variables that have little to do with legal
precedent, litigation strategies, or courts.
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